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To offer a more accurate picture of the opportunities and threats that Iran has been 
facing in the South Caucasus, it is important to be familiar with the main regional and 
external players, their goals, interests and policies in this region. Following a brief 
introduction about the South Caucasus and its general importance, this chapter will 
discuss the goals and policies of each major player together with a summarised history 
of their post Cold War involvement with the South Caucasus. Within this framework 
therefore, the relations and interactions of different players with individual countries of 
the South Caucasus has not been discussed in details, unless it has been part of a player’s 
general policy which has regional consequences, i.e. Turkey’s special relations with 
Azerbaijan. The chapter will argue that ‘balance of power’ and ‘increased security’ are 
two main goals of the players in the region. It will demonstrate the importance of energy 
resources and transit routes in exacerbating rivalry and bandwagonning between 
various players, and the way these players manipulate regional dynamics to achieve 
their goals. 
 
2.2. Where is South Caucasus? 
South Caucasus is a mountainous region, with an approximate area of 400,000 sq/km 
and a population of around 18 millions1. It straddles between the Caspian Sea on the 
East and the Black Sea on the West. The southern side of the region is neighbouring 
with the north west of Iran and the south east of Turkey. On the north, it is limited by 
Russia’s southern plains. (AmirAhmadian as quoted by Kazemi 2005: 33) 
The great Caucasus mountains with 1500 km length, starting from Taman peninsula in 
the north of the Black Sea, stretching to Absheron peninsula on the west side of the 
Caspian Sea pass through the great Caucasus land, dividing it into two northern and 
southern parts. On the southern parts of the mountains, from east to west, there are three 
Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. (ibid) 
                                                          




Map 2.1: Map of South Caucasus1 
 
 
2.3. General Importance of the South Caucasus 
South Caucasus; once a closed and forgotten area within the former Soviet Union, 
became “crowded with different kind of international actors, ranging from international 
organizations and states to multinational corporations” following the end of the Cold 
War. (Lynch 2003:15) Far from complementary, the motives behind the involvement 
of all these players in the region and their policies are varied and frequently 
contradictory. In order to have a better understanding and more informed analysis of 
the relations and policies of regional and external players, an overview of their goals 
and motives is necessary.  
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia; the three South Caucasus countries form the most 
                                                          
1  Caucasus - Political. Available at: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Caucasus-political_en.svg  
(Accessed on 10.09.2012).  
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complex, combustible and unstable region of the former Soviet Union. Lying at the 
crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East, the region has traditionally played an 
important role as a transit corridor and been the meeting point of ancient civilisations 
such as Persia, Russia, Europe, and China. “Yet as Alexander Rondeli has pointed out, 
the important geopolitical location of the South Caucasus has been as much, if not more, 
of a liability as it has an asset to regional states.” (Cornell 2004:126) 
However, it is important to keep in mind that the application of the term ‘region’ to 
south Caucasus is defined by the actions of outside players. Regional cooperation 
initiatives are not generated internally among these three countries, but are promoted 
“by external actors seeking stability in the region”. (German 2012:1)  
Russia’s reduced role and diminishing influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia in 
the early 1990s together with the determined efforts of regional states to diversify their 
relations with the outside world opened the doors for external actors to engage in the 
region. For various reasons the emerging new geopolitics became an arena of 
competition and rivalry between different regional and external players. While each of 
these players has different motives; some of the shared reasons for their interest in the 
region are as follows: 
 
 Energy Resources & Transport Routes 
As one of the eldest oil producing regions of the world, the Caspian Sea has increasingly 
became an important source of global energy and as such gained a particular importance 
in the gloal energy security. According to the US Department of Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), although territorial disputes and limited explorations have created 
obstacles for determining the exact amount of hydrocarbon resources, based on field level data, 
“EIA estimates 48 billion barrels of oil and 292 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and 
probable reserves in the wider Caspian basins area, both from onshore and offshore fields. 
Because the reserve figures include both proved and probable reserves, the figures are closer to 
a high-end estimate.”1According to BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy2; the region holds 
                                                          
1 Available at: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=CSR (Accessed on 
20.02.2016) 
2  Available at : http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html 
(Accessed on 20.02.2016) 
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about four percent of the world’s gas and oil reserves, and that estimate has not even considered 
Iran and Russia’s resources. 
Although Caspian energy resources are not comparable to that of the Persian Gulf, still are 
considerable alternatives for different energy markets such as EU, and some South East 
Asian countries. In order to guarantee the security of energy supplies, consumer countries 
need to diversify their sources. Caspian’s non OPEC hydrocarbon resources have attracted 
considerable investments from giant energy cartels, which could have otherwise be 
invested in the Middle Eastern countries. Hence, Caspian energy resources have become a 
vital factor both for economic development, as well “geopolitical configuration of the 
region”. (Johnson 2001:12) 
Within this energy rich but landlocked region, there is “no single means of exporting 
products without crossing another sovereign territory and no access to navigable waterways 
that are open to international shipping”. (Burke 1999:1) While some scholars describe the 
general struggle “to define the region’s future” as the “new Great Game”; others like 
Moradi (2006) believe that it is the power struggle over the control of hydrocarbon 
resources and transport routes that has created a post-Soviet “Great Game” with more 
players and greater rewards.  However, “the belief that whoever secures the major share of 
oil pipeline transit will gain enhanced influence not only throughout the South Caucasus 
and Central Asia, but also on a global political scale, has highlighted the concerns over the 
future stability of the region.” (Aydin 2012: 172) 
Due to lack of infrastructure or necessary capital for exploration and exploitation of 
resources, or development of transport routes by regional countries; the winners of the 
game were those who could offer more to solve the production or export problems.  
Investment in the region’s energy infrastructure has offered a prosperous perspective 
particularly for Western corporates. 
 Security 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the stability of the newly independent countries 
and the region has always been of major concern. The significance of security threats 
from unstable neighboring countries for Iran, Turkey, and Russia has been greater due 
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to their shared minorities with South Caucasus countries. 
The overwhelming transformation process that Caucasian countries faced in the post 
Cold War era encompassed “the building of new institutions, new states, new borders, 
new identities, new foreign policies and new military system”. (Lynch 2003:8) The 
scale of changes was so enormous that even without any conflicts; there was a great 
risk of instability in the area. However, there existed several other destabilizing factors 
as well. “The stability of the South Caucasus is threatened by its geopolitical 
significance, as well as numerous transnational security challenges including 
unresolved conflicts, organized crime, trafficking and migration.”(German 2012:1) 
Being “sandwiched between the two major routes used for smuggling heroin from 
Afghanistan to Europe”, as well as a “major supplier of arms and nuclear components, 
Russia, and the major markets for these commodities, the Middle East” (Cornell 
2003:37) has exacerbated regional security challenges. 
The political-military and security policies of involved players, as well as the 
smoldering conflicts of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, are other 
factors affecting the security in this region. While the leverage of regional powers, such 
as Turkey and Iran, and of global powers, such as the United States, Russia and China, 
is part of the power configuration in the region, several international organisations are 
also involved. “At the regional level, there is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(B.S.E.C.), the Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR) the Caspian Sea Force (CASFOR), 
the cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (G.U.A.M.) and 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (C.S.T.O.) within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (C.I.S.). At the global level, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(N.A.T.O.) and the European Union also exercise political weight in the South 
Caucasus.”(de Hass 2006:2) 
However, the importance of the security of energy resources and transport routes for 
both producer and consumer countries have continuously been a major continuous 
concern. “The consequence of destabilization in the Caucasus would be felt throughout 
Eurasia and would inevitably have a significant impact even on the remote powers of 





 Consumer Markets 
The independence of South Caucasus republics opened the markets of these countries 
to foreign trade. Different players were looking for trade opportunities in these new 
markets. As their economy developed, so did their trade with different countries.1  
While this small region with the population of just about 18 million may not be 
considered such a large market, but it plays the role of medium and transit for Europe 
and Eastern countries such as China through its transport systems, providing trade 
opportunities for both sides. The prospect of full integrationg into ‘the new Silk Road’ 
through advanced transport and technology infrastructure such as railroads, pipelines, 
fibre optic cables and power transmission grid locks enhances the region’s market 
value. 
2.4. Important Players in the South Caucasus 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the three republics of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; the South Caucasus emerged out of isolation 
catching the attention of various international players both with horrors of violent 
conflicts as well as the promise of fostering democratic developments. It became an 
arena of rivalry between regional players, complemented later with the arrival of 
outside players.  
This section will briefly review the goals, interests and policies of major regional and 
external players in the South Caucasus. Although an important regional player, Iran’s 




                                                          
1 For example US- Azerbaijan trade in goods for July 1992 included $0.1 million exports and $0.2 million imports. 
By July 2012, it has increased to $113.13 million exports and $71.5 million imports. US-Armenia trade in July 
1992 was $3.2 million in exports and $0.1 million in imports. This has increased to $4.0 million export and 8.0 
million imports. United States Census Bureau. Trade in Goods with Armenia. Available at: 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4631.html  (Accessed on 03.10.2012) 
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2.4.1. The United States 
Despite being among the first states to establish diplomatic relations with the South 
Caucasus countries and to support the sovereignty and independence of the newly 
independent states; the region did not bear much significance in the US foreign policy 
for a few years. This insufficient attention has been attributed to the “lack of knowledge 
and initiatives concerning the Caspian region, as well as a lack of realization of 
American interests there. The success of the Armenian lobby in convincing the 
American Congress to impose an embargo on Azerbaijan in the wake of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict illustrates the lack of proactive American policy in the region.” 
(Allison & Acker 1997 as quoted by Oktav 2005:17)  
However, as Brzezinski (1997:52) has advised; in order to secure its global hegemony 
and establish a favourable world order it was crucial for the US to prevent the rise of 
yet another Eurasian empire or strong adversary in the region. US regional policy during 
the first few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union included: 
 Ensuring the independence and sovereignty of the former republics of the Soviet 
Union and preventing their subservience to Russia.  
 Reducing Iran’s strategic influence in the region particularly among the Muslim 
population. In this context, the US public diplomacy apparatus made a great 
effort in portraying a violent and disturbing picture of Iran in contrast with an 
exaggerated ideal picture of Turkey.  
 Making sure “that nuclear or other major weaponry previously under the control 
of the Soviet regime was destroyed or returned to Russia.” (Jaffe 2001:136) 
Despite the US Department of Defense 1994 report describing the South Caucasus as a 
strategically important region due to its potential “to form an area of secular, 
independent, and Western friendly states between Russia and the Middle East” 
(Sherwood-Randall 1998 as quoted by Cornell 2005:111); it was not until the volume 
of Caspian energy resources came to the spotlight that more serious policy 
considerations were given to the region. In addition to US corporate interests; the 
Caspian oil boom has had other advantages for the US. One is the regional economic 
growth resulting from the production and transport of energy which could in turn 
improve the independence and sovereignty of South Caucasus countries and ensure 
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their move away from Russia’s dominance or Iran’s influence. It also offered an 
alternative option to the Middle East hydrocarbon resources. The 1999 US Silk Road 
Strategy Act clearly states that “the region of the South Caucasus and Central Asia 
could produce oil and gas in sufficient quantities to reduce the dependence of the United 
States on energy from the volatile Persian Gulf region.”1 Moreover, the politics of 
energy provided US with a perfect pretext for long term presence in the backyard of its 
rival, Russia and its adversary, Iran; as well as a defining role in regional politics. 
Consequently, since the second half of 1996, US started to take a proactive policy by 
announcing the Caucasus and Caspian basin important for its strategic interests; and 
appointing a ‘special envoy’ for this remote region.2  
As Cohen (2005:3) has pointed out, drawing the entirety of Eurasian Convergence Zone 
into the American geostrategic orbit became a major US military, economic, and 
political policy objective, much of which has been undertaken unilaterally. In order to 
balance the power in its favour; US effectively undertook a double edged policy 
towards regional players which has consequently led to the polarisation of the region. 
With regard to Russia and Iran, US took a zero sum dynamic ensuing isolation to block 
Iran’s influence in the area, and containment to prevent Russia from reasserting its 
hegemony over the region; while bringing Turkey, Israel, and Europe under the same 
umbrella of interest and general aims despite their differing goals and priorities. 
 
 Pipeline Diplomacy 
As Iseri (2009:34-35) has pointed out, “The political objective of the US government 
is to prevent energy transport unification among the industrial zones of Japan, Korea, 
Russia and the EU in the Eurasian landmass and ensure the flow of regional energy 
resources to US led international oil markets without any interruptions.” 
The Silk Road Strategy Act obliged the US government to “assist in the development 
                                                          
1 Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999. Available at: https://www.eso.org/gen-
fac/pubs/astclim/espas/maidanak/silkroad.html (Accessed on 21.08.2015). 
2 The Clinton Administration in 1994 established a special inter-agency working group to focus on Caspian policy. 
In May 1998, the US Trade and Development Agency, the US Export–Import Bank and the Overseas Private 
Investment Corp. announced the formation of the Caspian Finance Center in Ankara to facilitate the 
development of energy and other infrastructure projects in the Caspian region. Then in July 1998 President 
Clinton appointed Ambassador Richard Morningstar to the new position of Special Advisor to the President and 
Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy. For further detail see White House Fact Sheet, 
http://www.usis.it/file9911/alia/99111705.htm , (Accessed on 1.10.2012). 
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of the infrastructure necessary for communications, transportation, education, health, 
and energy and trade on an East-West axis”.1 However, prior to the Act, US was 
actively engaged in building alternative routes of energy export in partnership with 
several regional players. Despite compelling facts about the economic benefits of a 
north-south route from Russia to southern ports of Iran, US insisted on building east-
west pipelines in order to avoid both Russia and Iran. Despite serious doubts over the 
economic viability of such pipelines, the political advantages were so significant that 
US Energy Secretary took it on himself to directly negotiate with different regional 
heads of states2 to gain their support and commitment to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) project. Washington extended support to four other major pipeline projects 
including the South Caspian Gas Pipeline “which leads Azerbaijani gas via Georgia 
into Turkey and further to Europe.” (Baran 2005: 2) 
The political advantages of multiple pipeline routes for the US include: 
- Reducing Russia’s monopoly over export routes and, therefore, its leverage over 
export/importing countries as well as its control over the market.3 
- Excluding Iran from any major Caspian energy project.4 
- Control over the final destination of petroleum to ensure it reaches US 
controlled energy markets. 
- Sustaining US alliance with regional players through this economic bond. 
- Providing an acceptable justification for long term official US presence in the 
region. 
 
 Financial Aids 
South Caucasus countries have been continuously the subject of US financial aid since 
                                                          
1 Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999. Available at: https://www.eso.org/gen-
fac/pubs/astclim/espas/maidanak/silkroad.html (Accessed on 21.08.2015). 
2 Remarks by Secretary of Energy Federico Peña at the Caspian Pipelines Conference. Washington, D.C. 
November 19, 1997.  Available at: www.osti.gov/news/speeches97/caspian.htm  (Accessed on 20.08. 2011). 
3 While Iran was completely excluded from such projects, Russia was encouraged in participation, as in the same 
speech Pena says: “Russia, as both an energy producer and transit country, will be an important player in 
developing the Caspian region. We would welcome Russian participation in the east-west energy corridor." 
4 According to the Department of Energy press release, "In each meeting, Pena reinforced the U.S. government's 
opposition to investments in Iran's energy sector and any investment or transit of Caspian oil and gas through 
Iran." Pena said that the U.S. position "is clear -- we do not support conducting ordinary business with a country 
thatfunds, trains, and supports terrorists or seeks to acquire weapons of mass destruction." Available at: 
http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/energy/archive/1998/june/de1602.htm  (Accessed on 
02.10.2012) 
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their independence.1 According to the US Department of State the goal of this assistance 
has been the promotion of regional security through increasing the capability of these 
countries to combat domestic and transnational criminal activities; development of key 
democratic institutions of government and civil society to promote public participation, 
combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law; and far-reaching economic reforms 
which promote stability and sustainable growth in the non-oil sectors of the economy.2  
 
 Integration into Western/Pro Western Structures 
Another strategy to help in moving the Soviet’s ex- republics away from Moscow’s 
sphere of influence was to integrate them into Euro Atlantic structures or draw them 
into pro-Western alliances. GUAM is an example of such US backed initiatives, “a 
political, economic and strategic alliance between the post-Soviet states….. The 
GUAM countries which Moscow saw as a Trojan horse inside the CIS, sought to deepen 
their partnership with Western institutions and organisations like the EU and NATO.” 
(Baban & Shiriyev 2010:96) Russia’s concerns proved right when in 1999, Georgia, 
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan left the CIS and GUAM found a security and military 
dimension following Uzbekistan’s membership. 
 
  
                                                          
1 Cumulative US assistance budgeted for Azerbaijan from FY 1992 through FY 2010 was $976 million (all agencies 
and programmes). Budgeted aid to Azerbaijan was $26.4 million in FY2011 and an estimated $20.9 million in 
FY2012, and the Administration requested $16.3 million for FY2013 -the numbers for FY2011, FY2012, and 
FY2013 include “Function 150” foreign aid, and exclude Defense and Energy Department funds- (Nichols 2012: 
Summary). According to the US Department of State “The U.S. to date (March 2012) has provided Armenia with 
nearly $2 billion in development and humanitarian assistance.”1Also between “2006 to 2011, a Millennium 
Challenge Corporation Compact helped promote Georgian enterprise and economic growth through investments in 
physical infrastructure. In 2013, the MCC awarded Georgia a second compact, focused on education.”1 US 
Department of State. (2012) Armenia. Available at: http://m.state.gov/md197863.htm  (Accessed on 03.10.2012) 
AND US Department of State. (2012) Azerbaijan. Available at http://m.state.gov/md5253.htm (Accessed on 
05.11.2014)                                                                                                                    
 
2 US Department of State. (2009) Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Armenia. Available at: 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/167286.htm (Accessed on 10.10.2012) and US Department of State. (2009) 
Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Azerbaijan. Available at: 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/106462.htm (Accessed on 10.10.2012) AND 
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2.4.1.1. US Post Sep. 11th Involvement in the Caucasus 
The Post Sep.11th developments and the war on terror increased the importance of the 
South Caucasus for the United States as its new global strategy required significant 
military presence in that region. “The South Caucasus and Central Asia appeared 
indispensable for the successful prosecution of war in the heart of Asia.” (Cornell 
2005:113). Provision of landing and over flight rights as well as refueling facilities for 
US army by regional countries such as Azerbaijan and Georgia, not only facilitated the 
war on terror but also as Socor (quoted by Cornell 2005:113) has pointed out was a 
historical breakthrough; as it provided the opportunity for Western troops to set foot “in 
the heartland of Asia formerly the exclusive preserve of land empires.” Since 
transportation of troops and equipment was faced with various political and logistic 
challenges, these countries’ airspace proved to be “the only realistic route through 
which military aircraft could be deployed from NATO territory to Afghanistan. (ibid) 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, also, took part in the international Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) operations in Afghanistan and “sent troops to the coalition stabilization force in 
Iraq.” (Baban & Shiriev 2010:97) 
However, attention to South Caucasus gradually faded particularly during Obama’s 
initial years of administration not merely due to other pressing priorities, but also due 
to overall change of US foreign strategy. The failure of Bush’s ‘hard power’ strategy 
resulted in the new ‘smart power strategy’, which reduced the instrumental position of 
South Caucasus for US policies. 
As the August 2008 five days war between Georgia and Russia proved to US and other 
Western countries that Moascow’s interest in the South Caucasus cannot be ignored; 
Obama’s ‘reset’ policy towards Russia resulted in US “Move away from a zero sum 
approach to its relations with Moscow in the region”. (Mankoff 2012:18) Consequently; 
the “US policy towards countries in the region essentially became a derivative of 
Russia’s policy” failing to forge substantial long term partnerships. (Charap & Peterson 
as quoted by Koushakjian 2011:79) 
However, in pursuing improved relations with Russia and trying to help in the 
resolution of conflicts through the involvement of regional actors, US managed to 
dismay Azerbaijan so far as pushing it towards Russia. “It did not take long for 
Azerbaijan to react by taking a more pro-Russian turn by signing several key energy 
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deals with Moscow and joining the three party talks over Nagorno-Karabakh where 
Moscow had a dominant role.” (Suchkov 2011:144) 
The failure of Obama’s ‘reset’ efforts to “develop enough momentum to move the 
bilateral ties forward” (Kitazume 2012); as well as Russia’s increasing influence in the 
region, along with Azerbaijan’s tilt towards Russia, and other regional developments; 
triggered a review of US policy towards the South Caucasus. Though the 2010’s US 
defense Secretary and Secretary of State’s tour of South Caucasus was interpreted as a 
‘comeback’ signal from the US, many analysts believe that the United State’s South 
Caucasus policy would not change considerably.  
 
2.4.2. The European Union 
According to German, “the EU is the principal actor from outside of the wider Caucasus 
region engaged in efforts to promote cross border cooperation in the area” primarily as 
means of regional stabilisation. (2012:140) 
Abundant energy deposits of the South Caucasus which can provide the answer for 
Europe’s quest for diversification of energy supplies is a reasonable justification in 
itself for EU’s involvement. However, “EU member states have increasing economic 
interests in the region- a potentially lucrative and attractive place for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) - specially for multinational oil companies.” (Nuriyev 2010:3) 
On the other hand, as explained earlier in this chapter, “the region presents practically 
all security challenges that typify the post Cold War system.” (Gnesotto 2003:7) While 
the post Sep. 11th developments have increased the region’s security importance; 
following the EU’s 2007 enlargement the region has effectively become EU’s 
immediate neighbour, meaning regional security challenges are practically at the EU’s 
doorstep now. Hence, the development and stability of South Caucasus became a 
crucial imperative for EU’s security and economic relationships.  
Nontheless, it took several years before the EU moved towards a more active role and 
closer engagement with the region. The main reason might have been best described by 
Huseynov (2009:48) who argues that the reason was “not only geographical but also 
the mental distance separating the region from EU decision makers”. Helly (2001:2) 
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believes the cause to be “lack of clear analytical grid” in the EU, that unlike US does 
not have a ‘Silk Road Strategy’ to define priorities and draw a road map. As a result, 
despite the fact that “the European Union appeared on the South Caucasian scene from 
the early 1990s, when the process of transition towards market economy and democracy 
began in these countries and when conflict and petroleum loomed over the political 
landscape of the Caucasus” (Dekanozishvili 2003); the growing significance of the 
South Caucasus for EU has been gradual. The Union’s involvement in the region during 
the 1990s was mainly economic, based on short term regional developments and 
priorities of EU’s individual rotating presidents. 
In December 1990, the EU launched TACIS (Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States) programme “to sustain economic reform and 
development process in the CIS countries and to support their integration to the world 
economy”. (Demirag 2005:92) TRACECA and INOGATE are two important initiatives 
developed under TACIS. 
TRACECA which is “the technical assistance program for the development of the 
transport corridor between Europe and Asia across the Black Sea, the countries of the 
South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and the Central Asian countries was launched in May 
1993.”1The programme bears a strategic importance due to the provision of an 
alternative route to Europe which offers the opportunity to avoid the traditional Russian 
route.  
“INOGATE (Interstate Network of Oil & Gas Transport to Europe) which “supports 
energy policy cooperation between the EU and the littoral states of the Black and 
Caspian Seas and their neighboring countries”, was launched in 1995.2 
EU’s growing attention towards the South Caucasus was manifested in 1996 
Partnership & Cooperation Agreement which came into force in 1999. The Agreement 
offered a legal framework for dialogue in main areas. Then in 2001, at its General 
Affairs Council, EU confirmed “its willingness to play a more active political role in 
the South Caucasus region and its intention to look for further ways of prevention and 
                                                          
1 European Commission Please Release Database. (2012) EU support to the Europe-Caucasus-Asia Transport 
Corridor. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-141_en.htm  (Accessed on 05.11.2014) 
2 International Cooperation and Development. Central Asia- Energy. Available at : 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/central-asia/eu-central-asia-energy-cooperation_en  (Accessed on 
05.11.2014) 
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resolution of conflicts in the region and to participate in the post conflict rehabilitation”. 
(Alieva 2006:10) The appointment of an EU Special Representative for the South 
Caucasus in July 2003 helped in the acceleration of the process of developing a coherent 
strategy for the region. 
Three South Caucasus countries joined the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 
2004. ENP “is an extension of EU governance regime- norms, standards and values- 
beyond the political borders of the Union.” (Propescu 2006: 2) In 2005, the South 
Caucasus countries started consultation on the provision of Action Plans with the 
European Union. The Action Plans which are in fact road maps to comprehensive 
reforms “provide a point of reference for the programming and assistance to these 
countries”. (Alieva 2006:11)  Although the Plans are not legally binding; but the 
provision of enhanced strategic partnership “beyond cooperation and towards 
significant integration” (ibid) with the Union offers an attractive prospect and binding 
incentive for these countries. 
The main rationale behind the ENP for the EU is “developing the zone of prosperity 
and a friendly neighborhood with which EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative 
relationship”. (ibid) However, as some scholars1 have pointed out issues such as lack 
of a definite EU membership prospect for these three countries even after extensive 
reforms, and lack of any ‘conditionality factor’ that ties the progress of these countries 
in the execution of Action Plans to the amount of ENP aid they receive; play as 
hindrance to their real progress.  
 Following the 2007 EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the Union undertook the 
Black Sea Synergy (BSS) initiative which also includes the South Caucasus. Based on 
the Commission of European Countries communication with the Council and the 
European Parliament “There are significant opportunities and challenges in the Black 
Sea area that require coordinated action at regional level. These include key sectors 
such as energy, transport, environment, movement and security. Enhanced regional 
cooperation is not intended to deal directly with longstanding conflicts in the region but 
…..  over the time could help remove some of the obstacles in the way.” 
The above document further explains that since the broad EU policy for the region has 
                                                          
1 See Alieva 2006: 32, Mkrtchyan 2009:27. 
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already been set in Turkey’s pre accession strategy, the ENP and the Strategic 
Partnership with Russia; the BSS is supposed to play as a complementary strategy to 
the above policies. The primary task of this inclusive initiative is, therefore, the 
development of cooperation within the Black Sea region and also between the region 
and the European Union. The initiative covers different subject areas from democracy, 
Human Rights and good governance to energy, transport and environment. 
In May 2009, EU launched yet another initiative called ‘the Eastern Partnership 
Initiative’ which aimed to enhance relations with EU’s eastern neighbours including 
the three countries of the South Caucasus. According to the Commission’s documents 
“This would imply new association agreements including deep and comprehensive free 
trade agreements with those countries willing and able to enter into a deeper 
engagement and gradual integration in the EU economy. It would also allow for easier 
travel to the EU through gradual visa liberalisation, accompanied by measures to tackle 
illegal immigration. The Partnership will also promote democracy and good 
governance, strengthen energy security, promote sector reform and environment 
protection, encourage people to people contacts, support economic and social 
development and offer additional funding for projects to reduce socio-economic 
imbalances and increase stability.” (The European Union External Action Service) 
As demonstrated by the above examples while EU appreciates the importance of 
development and cross border cooperation for ensuring regional stability and security; 
it has avoided direct involvement in mediating efforts to end regional conflicts which 
is one of the most serious security threats in the South Caucasus. The Union has left the 
sensitive task of mediation and negotiations for conflict resolution to other international 
organisations such as OSCE, and the Minsk Group. 
 
2.4.3. NATO  
As an organisation whose main mission is the provision of defence and security for its 
members (mainly EU & US), NATO’s objectives changed after the end of the Cold 
War; requiring to reshape its activities and review its relations particularly with the 
former Soviet republics in order to both survive as a viable organisation and to pursue 
the security interests of its members.  
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Keeping in mind that the South Caucasus is “an integral part of the arc of instability 
stretching from North Africa to Southeast Asia, which the U.S. has identified as the 
most likely source of threats against U.S. and Western security interests in the 
foreseeable future” (Cornell 2004:128) wil help in having a better understanding of 
NATO’s role and policies in the region.   
In order to keep a reasonable degree of involvement in the region, the Alliance had to 
rebuild its own image for the South Caucasus countries while avoiding any tensions 
with Russia, who has been sensitive about any Western expansion in its sphere of 
influence. Therefore since 1990s NATO became involved with these countries through 
flexible programmes such as ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PfP), which “allows partners to 
build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for 
cooperation”.1  
This initiative “was launched in January 1994 NATO summit to establish strong links 
between NATO, its new democratic partners in the former Soviet bloc, and some of 
Europe's traditionally neutral countries to enhance European security. It provides a 
framework for enhanced political and military cooperation for joint multilateral crisis 
management activities, such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.”2 
The three South Caucasus republics joined this programme and appointed liaison 
officers in April 1994. Since then they have been active participants of different PfP 
activities. “They also participate in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), 
which offers them the opportunity to hold political discussions and receive assistance 
on political and security issues. In addition all three participate in the Planning and, 
Review Process (PARP) which aims to ensure interoperability between NATO 
members and partner countries.” (German 2012:153) 
As already explained the war on terror increased the importance of the region and raised 
its profile for NATO. Examples of the crucial supporting role that these countries 
played in both Afghanistan and Iraq war have already been discussed. However, for 
exactly the same reason following the post September 11th developments the ‘security 
                                                          
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2014) The Partnership for Peace Programme. Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm  (Accessed on 13.02.2015) 
2 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (1995) Fact Sheet: NATO Partnership for Peace, Bureau of Public Affairs. 
Available at: http://www.fas.org/man/nato/offdocs/us_95/dos950519.htm  (Accessed on 27.12.12) 
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deficit’ of the region, was transformed to “a threat not only to regional security but also 
for Euro Atlantic interests”. (Cornell, McDermott, O’Malley, et al. 2004:13) The 
Alliance, therefore, resorted to another cooperation project called Individual 
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) to help in upgrading regional security. 
The IPAP instrument was inaugurated at the 2002 Prague Summit as a mechanism to 
tailor relations with specific countries, which may include eventual membership. “The 
main spheres of cooperation under the IPAP are security, defense and military issues, 
public information, science, environment, and democratic reforms.” (Poghosyan 
2012:4). “In November 2002, Georgia and in April 2003 Azerbaijan officially became 
aspirants to NATO membership which entails working closely with NATO allies, 
particularly US and Turkey for reforming their security sector.” (Cornell, McDermott, 
O’Malley, et al. 2004:26) Armenia was the last country who agreed on an IPAP and 
formally tied itself to NATO in 2005.  
NATO’s involvement in the South Caucasus is generally limited to broad projects, 
rather than regionally focused initiatives (German 2012:156). Moreover, as German 
(2012:155) argues NATO’s very presence and its relationship with the three states led 
indirectly to 2008 Georgia- Russia conflict and, therefore, has undermined regional 
cooperation programmes.  
As it was already mentioned major Euro-Atlantic players have left the task of mediation 
for conflict resolution to Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
and “limited their involvement to political support for the so called OSCE Minsk Group 
process.” (ibid: 158) the OSCE’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh began in 1992 
with the initiation of an international conference in Minsk aiming at the provision of a 
permanent forum for peace negotiations. Nuriyev (2007:314) considers this a major 
breakthrough in peacemaking operations. However, for various reasons such as lack of 
“expertise and interests of Western democracies in the region” or limitation of Western 
democracies’ efforts to “mediating between the sides and producing joint proposals” 
(ibid: 315) or Russia’s biased involvement; the OSCE has not been able to resolve the 
conflict completely and has only managed to establish a degree of containment which 
does not seem long lasting. 
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2.4.4. Russia  
During the first few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, for two main reasons, 
Russia did not have a clear policy towards the South Caucasus. First; Moscow was too 
busy dealing with the aftershocks of such sudden and total collapse of the empire in 
which Russia was the core state. Salvaging the economy from total collapse and 
preventing further disintegration was prior to other policies. Second was the Western 
orientation of statesmen such as the foreign minister Kozyrev who believed that Russia 
“should pay little attention to the former Soviet republics that were not inclined to 
cooperate with Moscow”. (Smolansky 1995:204) 
However, a policy shift towards ‘Eurasianism’ became evident since 1992. This view 
rejected Russia’s subordinate approach towards the West and insisted that Moscow 
must pursue its interests “regardless of whether such course of action was acceptable to 
its Western partners or not…. This meant, in part, re-establishing and maintaining 
Russian influence over the former Soviet Republics.” (ibid: 205) As a result of that 
policy shift and following its economic revival, Russia became the most significant 
outside player in the Caucasus “given its ability to project power on both sides of the 
Caucasus mountains and the array of Soviet-era political, economic, and social links 
between Russia and the Big Caucasus as a whole.” (Mankoff 2012:8)  
The discourse about the priority of Russia’s ‘near abroad’ which had emerged since 
1992, became an official policy from 1993. (Quoted by Buzan & Waever, 2003:404) 
Since then, Russia has taken an assertive approach towards its near abroad, including 
Transcaucasia, with repeated calls from Russian statesmen claiming those regions as 
part of Russia’s strategic sphere of influence.    
According to Nixey (2012:15), “Russia’s 19th-century expansion into the South 
Caucasus and Central Asia remains an important legacy for its 21st-century foreign 
policy decision-makers. It sustains a belief that Russia has a natural right to pre-
eminence in both regions: one ‘legitimized’ by tradition as well as present-day mutual 
interest.” There are, however, several reasons for the importance of the South Caucasus 
for Russia, including: 
1. The region is playing the role of the buffer zone between Russia and the Middle 
East. 
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2. It is neighbouring two other important regional players; Turkey and Iran. 
3. It is the house to a considerable share of the Caspian energy resources, which can 
affect Russia’s share of Europe’s energy market. 
4. Competing energy routes throughout the region which have been launched or 
planned following the Western penetration of the South Caucasus have major 




Map 2.2: The South Caucasus and its Neighbours1 
 
 
Contrary to those scholars who believe that Russia still holds imperialistic tendencies; 
others like De Waal (2010) argue that “Russia is undertaking the painful transition to 
being a ‘post-imperial power’, which seeks to be the most powerful actor in its 
neighborhood but no longer wants to re-establish an empire, with all the colonial 
burdens accompanied by such status.” 
One of Putin’s first actions immediately after his rise to power was “to order the revision 
and reformulation of national security and foreign policy concepts as well as the 
military doctrine of the Russian Federation that dated from the Yeltsin era. All three 
                                                          
1 Melikyan, R. (2011) The New Strategy of U.S policy in the South Caucasus: Priorities and Outlines. Available 
at: http://romanmelikyan.livejournal.com/3442.html . (Accessed on 10.09.2012)  
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revised documents accentuated the Russian determination to facilitate the achievement 
of a multi-polar system of international relations despite outside attempts to hinder 
Russia’s efforts in this direction.” (Kelikitli 2008:74) In this context, Russia has two 
main goals in the South Caucasus. The first is to make sure that regional countries stay 
under its own sphere of influence. The second is to contain the growing Western 
influence in the region.  In order to achieve these goals, Russia has undertaken several 
policies which the followings are amongst the most important ones: 
 
 Pipeline Diplomacy 
Energy has been the arena for Russia’s intense rivalry with other players. Since most 
energy infrastructures in the region were remaining from the Soviet era, the majority of 
the oil and gas transport routes used to pass through Russia. Securing Russia’s 
monopoly or at least some degree of control over the pipeline networks has been at the 
core of the country’s energy strategy, which is in the context of a rather grander strategy 
of keeping its dominance over Europe’s energy market.  
The new pipeline networks (Like Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan, Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum and 
Turkmenistan–China pipelines or Nabucco) are a source of threat to Russia’s interests 
as they have curbed Russia’s monopoly over the energy transport routes and reduced 
its revenue from transit rights and limited Moscow’s control over the routes and 
Europe’s energy market.  
To counter, or at least limit such threat, Russia has initiated competing pipeline projects 
such as Blue Stream and South Stream. “The main purpose of the South Stream is to 
prevent Nabucco to transport Caspian gas directly to European market bypassing 
Russia. Nabucco is the backbone of Europe’s attempt for diversification of natural gas. 
If South Stream goes forward, Nabucco pipeline will lose its strategic as well as 
commercial importance and Russia will be able to maintain influence over the EU and 
continue using energy dependency as a political weapon against the West. At the same 
time, Russia will be able to increase its political control over the Caucasus and Central 
Asia as well.” (Gogbrishvili 2010: 34) 
It has been contemplated that casting doubts on the security of Western backed 
pipelines and, therefore, reducing the reliability of these routes has been one of Russia’s 
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goals in its 2008 war with Georgia. ‘Security’ and ‘viability’ are key issues for partners 
of such large ventures. “If foreign investors and companies were to lose trust in Georgia 
as a safe transit nation, then the Nabucco project would be shelved.”  
 
Map 2.3: South Caucasus Energy Transport Routs; Where Oil and Water Mix1 
 
 
 Managing Conflicts 
Russia has been actively involved in regional ethno-territorial conflicts either as a 
mediator or an ally for one side. According to Hill & Taspinar (2006:17) “leading 
policy- makers, ...., have sought to apply a policy paradigm of controlled instability in 
the South Caucasus through ‘peacekeeping’ and mediation in ethnic conflicts and 
through military footholds in the region. This policy is based on perpetuating the 
conflicts within predictable and usable parameters, frustrating their settlement without 
allowing their escalation. The primary goal is political leverage over Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, through Russian arbitration among the parties to those 
conflicts and through preservation of local protectorates in areas of Russian troop 
deployment.” 
                                                          
1 Ivanova, N. (2009) The Forgotten South Caucasus: Where Oil and Water Mix. Available at: 
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2009/world/the-forgotten-south-caucasus-where-oil-and-water-mix/ 
(Accessed on 20.06.2012) 
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Nixey (2012:4-10) considers Moscow’s objection to deployment of international peace 
keeping forces and adjustments in the make-up of the Minsk group as evidences which 
prove that Russia’s interest to play a central role in the management of Nagorno- 
Kharabakh conflict is more the matter of gaining control rather than genuine interest in 
the resolution of the conflict. As a result, while there has not been considerable 
development in the resolution of the conflict, one of the most significant achievements 
of the process in the past few years has been the consequent rapprochement between 
Moscow and Baku, and the resulting growth of Russian influence over Azerbaijan.  
 
 Managing Alliances 
Moscow’s top policy for countering Western sponsored regional alliances like GUAM 
and OSCE is to manage new regional alliances that would help Russia to keep the 
former Soviet republics under its own sphere of influence. This includes development 
of organisations such as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Using different means, Moscow has managed to 
persuade all three South Caucasus countries to join CIS with Georgia being the last one 
to join in 1993. However, according to German (2012:104) since the former Soviet 
republics were not prepared for ceding any of their sovereignty into any central 
authority, the CIS has failed to develop into an effective regional organisation. As a 
result, while the CIS has been “useful as a forum for certain kinds of interaction and 
association”, but it lacks dynamism. (Nation 2007: 20) Nevertheless, the CIS became 
the origin of Eurasian Economic Community in 2001and is facilitating trade exchange 
and customs among the CIS countries.  
Also in 2002 CSTO emerged from within the CIS and “since then it has striven to assert 
its legitimacy as a regional security forum.” (ibid) However as Nation (2007:28) 
explains; “there is little evidence of any kind of effective security interaction relevant 
to the needs of the region as a whole. Polarization along a fault line defined by great 
power priorities not related intrinsically to the interests of the Caucasus itself defines 
patterns of association in the security realm.” 
According to Hill and Taspinar (2006:12) “insisting on special arrangements (like the 
NATO-Russian Council) … or deliberately undermining institutions (through, for 
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example, its efforts to block the budget of the OSCE in 2005)”; are among alternative 
methods that Russia has employed to achieve its goal of weakening Western sponsored 
alliances. So far it seems that despite incompetency of the Russian led organisations; 
Moscow has achieved this goal - at least partially, as the 2008 war diminished the 
Western leaning GUAM group. Moreover, “the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, of which all three South Caucasus states plus Russia are also 
members, has been weakened by Russia because of disagreements over the institution’s 
democracy promotion agenda.”(Nixey 2012:7) 
 
 Using Economic Leverages 
One of the Soviet era legacies is the interwoven, asymmetric economic relation between 
Russia and South Caucasus countries. “Russia remains the principal economic power 
in the region and many key enterprises are in the hands of Russian investors, including 
critical infrastructure such as mobile telephone communications and energy.” (German 
2012:98) 
In an effort to gain further political leverage over its neighbours, Moscow has tried to 
find a strong foothold in their economies through major investments or ‘equity for debt’ 
deals. The latter is particularly true with regard to Armenia. During Kucharian’s 
presidency, many state owned strategic assets were transferred to Russia in return to 
writing off the country’s debt, creating concerns about Armenia’s sovereignty. Georgia 
is also over relying on Russian capital, not to the same degree but enough to cause 
concerns. “There are numerous examples of Georgian companies, particularly within 
strategic sectors, passing under Russian control.” (Geraman 2012:100) This 
phenomenon has continued even after the 2008 war. 
Owing to its natural resources which have brought economic prosperity, Baku is less 
tangled in Moscow’s grip than its two neighbours. Russia only controls the Baku–
Novorossiysk oil pipeline and has some shares in electricity and aluminium industries. 
(Nixey 2012:5) However, Nixey (ibid: 6) believes that “Russia’s greatest economic 
lever with Azerbaijan and Armenia is in the form of migrant workers and their 
remittances. For example, Azerbaijan has approximately two million citizens working 
in Russia, sending $2.5 billion back home – 10% of GDP. The Azeri population resident 
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in Russia constitutes a particularly strong form of leverage insofar as Russia has 
threatened to deport illegal workers and impose a visa regime.” 
 
2.4.5. Turkey  
One of the main advantages of the independence of the former Soviet republics for 
Turkey was to create a buffer zone between the Russian Federation and Turkey, 
relieveing Ankara from the security challenges of sharing land borders with the Russian 
Federation.  
Turkey’s initial calculation was that if these republics were empowered to a degree that 
they could “resist outside pressure and interventions, then Turkey’s historical, political, 
economic and strategic regional pull would gently push them towards Ankara’s orbit”. 
(Aydin 2012:174) The incentives were strong enough to encourage Ankara to officially 
recognise the independence of these republics even before US or other Western powers 
do so and to support these countries in their process towards gaining political stability.  
The emergence of Turkey as NATO’s new front line state with obvious Westward 
orientation resulted in the assumption by both Turkey and the West particularly the US, 
that Ankara would be able to fill in the vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and play as the new regional superpower who will help in containing Russia to 
rise and spread its influence in the region, and will pave the way for the infiltration of 
the West in the region. It could also help in preventing Iran from drawing Muslim 
republics of the former Soviet Union under its own influence and promoting Islamic 
extremism. As a result, there was a widespread support and propaganda by the West 
towards the ‘Turkish model’ of governance as opposed to the Iranian model. Therefore 
at least for the first decade after the end of the Cold War, Turkey was trying to balance 
the challenging task of an influential regional player while proving its functionality to 
the West both as a NATO ally and as a prospective EU member.  
While quite happy for the Turkey to play a role in containing Iran’s influence and 
development of Islamic extremism in the region; Russia has been otherwise very 
sensitive towards Turkey’s plans. Ankara became eventually aware that “it needs to 
accommodate Russian interests at least until it has consolidated its own influence.” 
(Goskel 2011:20) 
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Although the establishment of the Agency for Turkish Cooperation and Development 
in 1992 provided an instrument for economic cooperation between Turkey and 
Caucasus countries (Steinbach 2012: 155); since Turkey did not have the necessary 
capabilities required for replacing the Soviet Union, less than a decade after the end of 
the Cold War, while Ankara had failed to leave up to its ambitious rhetorics and the 
expectations of the newly independent republics, Russia’s leverage in the region had 
prevailed.  
Faced with regional realities and international distaste, Turkey’s initial fervours for 
fulfilling its pan Turkic aspirations within the post Soviet space faded away 
considerably and was replaced with more economic and security dimensions. 
Nonetheless, Ankara has never quitted playing the role of big brother for Azerbaijan. 
An obvious and ongoing example is Turkey’s border closure with Armenia following 
the occupation of Azeri territories by Yerevan despite all diplomatic and economic 
restrictions that it has brought for Ankara to play the role of an influential regional 
power.  
Turkey has been actively engaged with at least one other important regional geopolitical 
development, which is the pipeline diplomacy.  Since the early 1990s when the policy 
of curtailing Russia’s monopoly over the pipeline routes was undertaken by Western 
players, Turkey has continuously been one of the most active partners in various 
pipeline development projects. “The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil and the Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzerum (BTE) gas pipeline, as well as the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline 
from Russia and all the other planned connections (Kazakh oil to BTC, Turkmen, 
Iranian and Iraqi gas, further Russian gas through Blue Stream II, and connecting all 
these to Europe through Nabucco) are aimed at making Turkey a regional energy 
player.” (Aydin 2012:175) Turkey’s involvement in pipeline diplomacy has evolved 
throughout the two decades after the end of the Cold War. While Ankara was initially 
happy to be a partner in these projects, and then content for the role of energy corridor; 
under the AKP government the aspiration for becoming a regional energy hub has 
become a pillar in Turkey’s foreign policy. 
The pipelines have further strengthened Ankara- Baku link and created a trilateral 
alliance involving these two as well as Tbilisi. The unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict has resulted in the exclusion of Armenia from pipeline projects, despite the 
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potential to provide the shortest route from Azerbaijan to Mediterranean. With US’s 
insistence on boycotting Iran from any pipeline route, the only left option is Georgia. 
The pipeline based cooperation has resulted in Turkey becoming both Azerbaijan and 
Georgia’s biggest trade partner.  
The rise of the AKP to power in 2002 offered an opportunity for Ankara to review its 
foreign policy. The articulation of priorities in this reviwed foreign policy included 
stability in the neighbourhood, zero-problems and increased economic ties with 
neighbours (trade and investment), becoming an energy hub between Eurasia and 
Europe, and bridging the global religious/civilisational divide. (Goskel 2011:17) 
Turkey’s failed attempt for EU membership and the 2003 Iraq war provided the 
opportunity for Ankara to act more independent of the West, as it had fewer incentives 
for appeasing the West. 
However, it was the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict which convinced Turkey to 
assume a more proactive and constructive role in the region, due to concerns over 
exclusion from major regional geopolitical developments, which could in turn affect its 
economic interests particularly as a transport and energy hub. Hence, “Erdogan 
resurrected an idea – earlier proposed by his predecessor, Süleyman Demirel – of a 
Caucasus Peace and Stability Platform (CPSP).” (Oskanian 2011:24)  “The CSCP 
maintained the channels of communication and dialogue open with Russia and has been 
a good tactical move to overcome tensions between Georgia and Russia.” (Punsmann 
2010:3)   
An important characteristic of the CSCP initiative was to focus on regional players and 
exclude the EU and US. However, according to Gorgulu & Krikorian (2012:4) the 
exclusion of Western players “was of particular concern to Georgia, which has close 
relations with both parties.”  Moreover, Turkey was not seen as an objective player as 
it is closer to Azerbaijan than Armenia. “In the end, the platform was rejected by both 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, while Armenia did not directly oppose the initiative.” (ibid) 
Summing up Turkey’s engagement with the South Caucasus it can be concluded that 
although Ankara has not yet succeeded in realising the ambition “for a leading role in a 
region extending from the Adriatic Sea to China, including the Central Asian republics, the 
Caucasus, the region around the Black Sea and the Balkans” (Goskel 2011:5 quoted from 
Freddy De Pauw) but has taken some steps in this direction by “endeavor to solve problems 
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with neighbors, including Armenia, to turn Turkey into an energy hub, to deepen 
collaboration with Russia, to increase the prominence of Islam as a soft power instrument, 
and to position itself as a leader in the Middle East defined Turkey’s geopolitical priorities 
and caused realignments in the Caucasus.” (ibid)  
 
2.5. Conclusions 
The emergence of new geopolitical entities and realities in the area which used to be an 
integral part of the Soviet Union was one of the consequences of the collapse of that 
superpower and the end of the Cold War. 
In addition to security challenges stemming from the geostrategic circumstances of the 
South Caucasus, the region became crowded by numerous regional and outside players 
each seeking their own interests and undertaking policies to ensure those interests. Rivalries 
and competition of various players for influence and power, which has been particularly 
evident with regard to the Caspian energy resources and transport routes resulted in a 
situation branded by some analysts as the ‘new Great Game”. 
‘Balance of power’ and ‘Security’ are the two concepts which can summarise US goals 
generally in Eurasia and particularly in the South Caucasus. Securing the position of the 
‘sole superpower’ by spreading its sphere of influence in the region and preventing the 
rise of any regional power or strong adversary who can challenge such status has been 
the primary objective of US regional policies since the end of the Cold War. Security of 
‘energy resources’, routes and markets are another part of this goal. 
Resorting to Pipeline diplomacy, initiatives for integrating the former Soviet republics 
in Western oriented organisations and financial aids have been among the most 
important instruments employed by the United States to achieve its goals and establish 
a comfortable influential position in the politics and economies of the region. However, 
the overall scope of US interest in the region will depend very much on future strategic 
significance of the region for US policies; including developments in Iran-US relations. 
EU’s main goals in the region have been: 
1- Diversification of energy supplies using Caspian energy resources as well as 
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diversification and increased security of transport routs both for energy and goods. 
2- Development of  security and stability in the region through political and 
economic development 
To achieve these goals EU has gradually increased involvement in the region through 
joint ventures and multifaceted economic and political development programmes. 
However, while various initiatives have increased EU’s involvement in the South 
Caucasus; they “do not yet constitute a coherent policy…… rather serve as building 
blocks of an emerging EU vision for the region.” (Huseynov 2009:51)  
The goal of NATO, as the security and foreign policy arm of the US and EU has been 
improvement of security and stability in the region to ensure the interests of its 
members. To achieve this goal, the organisation has executed various flexible initiatives 
aiming to develop security cooperation with regional countries with the prospect of 
NATO membership which has been particularly attractive for Georgia. 
Russia has employed different means from competing organisations and pipeline 
networks, to manipulating conflicts and economies to balance its power against US by 
keeping regional countries under its own sphere of influence, and containing the 
increasing influence of the West. Where none of those means has achieved the expected 
result, Moscow has used its economic leverage or military might to get what it wants. 
The 2008 war with Georgia was a reminder for other players particularly the United 
States and NATO that Russia would not let any other player get the upper hand in its 
strategic sphere of influence and would not tolerate zero-sum games.  
Despite its initial quest for filling the vacuum left by the Soviet’s collapse, Turkey fell 
short of its ambitions and contented to being a major regional power. Nevertheless, 
through active participation in major pipeline network initiatives, Turkey has not only 
taken steps in becoming the regional energy hub but has also established close relations 
with both Azerbaijan and Georgia. Still, Ankara needs to have some degree of relations 
with all countries of the South Caucasus to be able to play the role of an influential 
regional player. The fact that Turkey’s relations with Armenia have become the hostage 
of Nagorno- Karabakh conflict has reduced Ankara’s influence and manoeuvring 
capacity. 
Further polarisation of the region in the wake of rivalries for power and influence is one 
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of the important post Cold War developments in the South Caucasus, with Armenia 
continuing to be Russia’s loyal ally and Georgia’s considerable tilt towards the West 
and its enthusiasm for integration into Euro- Atlantic alliances which has further 
exacerbated Russia’s sensitivities towards Western players. However, the 2008 
Georgia-Russia war altered the geopolitical balance of the region and forced other 
players to recalculate their strategies. 
With the exception of Iran, the goals and policies of major players in the South 
Caucasus was examined in this chapter. The next chapter will review Iran’s foreign 
policy as an introduction for the consequent chapter which will examine Iran’s regional 
policy in both the Middle East and South Caucasus.  
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